


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ungeschultes Zeugnis imperialistischen

Berlin. „Neues Deutschland“ ist in der Lage, heute unserem Volke und der Weltöffentlichkeit den authentischen Text eines geheimen Schreibens zur Kenntnis zu bringen, das der Erbe des größten amerikanischen Öltrusts, Standard Oil Corporation, Nelson A. Rockefeller, im Januar 1956 an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gerichtet hat. Der Text, der uns in englischer Originalfassung und in vollem Wortlaut vorliegt, stammt aus einer unbedingt zuverlässigen Quelle.



Ausschnitt aus dem vertraulichen Schreiben Rockefellers an Eisenhower

Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungsprogramm der SED

Bonn (ND). In zunehmendem Maße wird in westdeutschen bürgerlichen und adenauertreuen Zeitungen gefordert, im Wahlkampf nicht die Frage der Wiedervereinigung zu behandeln. Das Stichwort für die CDU-Zeitungen gab das Klerus-Blatt „Christ und Welt“ am 9. Februar. In einem ausführlichen Kommentar zu den Deutschlandvorschlägen des Zentralkomitees der SED verlangt es

gramm für die Sicherung einer friedlichen Zukunft Deutschlands und die demokratische Wiedervereinigung besitzt. Das ist inzwischen auch vom Ausland her bestätigt worden, nicht zuletzt durch die Botschaft Bulgariens an Adenauer.

Geraade durch die Konfrontierung des Programms der SED mit der zur gleichen Zeit im Bundestag vorgebrachten aggressiven Konzeption der

Der amerikanische Ölmilliardär Rockefeller gibt in diesem Präsidenten der USA Empfehlungen, wie die unabhängigen der ganzen Welt sowie die Kolonien der alten Kolonialmächte britannien, Frankreich, Portugal, Belgien und Holland über „Hilfe“, wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit, politische Abhängigkeit und durch Militärpakte unter amerikanische Kontrolle gebrochene Kriege für amerikanische Interessen gestürzt werden sollen.

Rockefeller legt in dem Geheimdokument dar, wie dieses Recht in Westeuropa mit Hilfe des Marshallplans „unter Anwendung einer Art von Druck“ zur Schaffung des NATO-Kriegspaktes gefördert werden soll. Besonders ist die offenkundige Schilderung des amerikanischen Herrschers, daß das amerikanische Außenministerium unter der Leitung von John Foster Dulles mit Hilfe des SEATO-Paktes beabsichtigt Krieg gegen die Volksrepublik China zu provozieren.

Das Dokument enthüllt die Herrschaft des amerikanischen Kapitals im Iran. Dazu bemerkt Rockefeller: „Gegenwärtig will Schah noch nicht einmal wagen, irgendwelche Veränderungen im Kabinett durchzuführen, ohne unseren Botschafter zu konsultieren.“

Als Politik gegenüber Ägypten empfiehlt Rockefeller, dem Land eine „Hilfe“ bei der Durchführung solcher Bauvorhaben auf die seine Kräfte übersteigen und es dadurch in amerikanische Macht zu bringen. Rockefeller fährt fort: „Ich erachte es als höchste Art der Zusammenarbeit auf andere Länder auszudehnen.“ Insbesondere die Türkei, die bereits zuverlässige „antikommunistische“ Regierungen haben, sollen bei der Kreditgebung nach dem Prinzip arbeiten: „Der geangelt Fisch braucht keinen Köder.“

In den Kolonien der alten Kolonialmächte sollen die national

Offensive gegen Militärberatung des Präsidiums des Nationalrats / Erklärung ein

Berlin (ND). Das Präsidium des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front führte am 13. Februar unter Vorsitz von Prof. Dr. Dr. Correns eine Beratung über die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der Nationalen Front durch. Prof. Al-

Loch; Erich Mückenberger, Wilhelm Koenen, Karl Naimark und Dr. Dr. Gerickes das Wort ergriffen.

Im regen Meinungsaustausch ergab sich die einmütige Auffassung, daß die durch die 30. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED unterbreiteten Vorschläge zum Kampf

CPYRGHT

Approach to Relaxed 2001/07/28 11:14 RDP78-p0015 R001100250012 global -
i.e. embrace every part of the world and also "total" i.e. include
political, psychological, economic, military and special methods integrated
into one whole. In other words the task is to hitch all our horses
in a single team. To illustrate my point of view better I want to attempt
some analysis - even if it is a superficial one - of some aspects of our
foreign policy as it has been conducted in Europe and Asia.

In Europe we started with economic aid. It is quite possible that without the Marshall Plan we would have found it much more difficult to form NATO. What in fact happened in this case was that a coordinated foreign policy, using every kind of pressure, resulted in the creation of what we hoped was a solid military union. Even critics within NATO itself say that it suffers from undue emphasis on the military aspects at the expense of the economic factors which played such a big role in its formation.

In Asia our efforts were far less successful. The principal reason for this can, I believe, be clearly stated: the conception of force was too nakedly shown; too much stress was laid on the military side while we largely ignored the importance of preliminary economic preparation for the alliances we wished to make.

This underestimation of the vital economic aspects on the part of the State Department has led to the creation of SEATO and the Baghdad pact on a foundation of sand. And I would prefer to see the sand cemented. The American tradition has been that "the Flag follows trade". In spite of this wise tradition all our energy was directed to building up the military side of SEATO. It is hardly plausible, however, that the members of SEATO would want to be involved in a war against communist China, with the US backing Chiang Kai-shek. Yet this apparently was the State Department's calculation.

2. In order to strengthen and, if possible, to broaden these alliances we must draw up a program of economic development extensive enough for us to have in Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas a political and military influence as great or greater than that we obtained through the Marshall Plan in Europe. That is why the main flow of our economic allocation for underdeveloped countries should be channelled through bodies set up to serve our military alliances. This should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive. If necessary, certain changes in the form of these alliances should be considered.

In other words, wherever possible we should, emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should widely and wisely make use of economic aid to those countries which we intend to draw into alliance with us, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the provision of economic aid with demands to join one or other of our alliances in such a crude manner that many potential allies were alienated. It is necessary for us to act carefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid (in some exceptional cases - even without any concessions in return.) The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands.

You seemed to be ruled by these considerations when you agreed to offer economic aid to Egypt to help it with the construction of the Aswan Dam. If the Nasser Government accepts this aid a situation will be created in which Egypt will inevitably become bogged down in over-ambitious construction and will need our support for a long period of time. I think it logical to extend this type of co-operation to other countries. And in particular never to forget the theory of cumulative rather than immediate political demands on which it is based.

3. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to each of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist
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stable long-term military agreements. In this case governmental subsidies

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In other words, wherever possible we should emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should widely and wisely make use of economic aid to those countries which we intend to draw into alliance with us, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the vision of economic aid with demands to join one or other of our alliances in such a crude manner that many potential allies were alienated. It is necessary for us to act carefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid (in some exceptional cases - even without any concessions in return.) The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands.

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3. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which US economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to each of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist Governments friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through stable long-term military agreements. In this case Governmental subsidies and credits may take the form mainly of military appropriations. The hooked fish needs no bait. Here I agree with the State Department, that the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to Turkey, might under certain circumstances bring results exactly the opposite of those intended, might, that is, strengthen its tendency to independence and to weakening its existing military alliances. Such countries may be

of a nationalism so strong as to escape not only from the control of the old colonial powers but also from our own control.

Extensive economic aid to all three groups of countries should always be presented as the expression of a sincere and disinterested desire on the part of the US to help and cooperate with them. We cannot afford to economise in ramming home by every propaganda means available to us the disinterested nature of US policy as regards aid to underdeveloped countries. We do not economise on our anti-communist work. Meanwhile our investors, our technical experts, and other specialists should make it their business to penetrate every branch of the national economy of backward countries, and to develop them with due respect for our own interests and encouraging the national ambitions of those native businessmen whose political loyalty is not in doubt.

It seems to me that provided all these recommendations are carried out the result should be not only to strengthen the international position of the US as a whole but would also considerably facilitate the fulfillment of any military tasks that may confront us in the future by strengthening existing military arrangements and breathing new life into them.

I would not have written this letter and I certainly would not have written at such length, if I had not been confident of your sympathy with the ideas expressed here, and if I did not hope that these ideas would help us in shaping our policy along sound lines.